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ESG Practices and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from EU Countries 
Abstract  
 
Using legitimacy and institutional theories, this study investigates whether lending institutions 
reward firms in 15 EU countries for their environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
performance and disclosure in terms of lowering their cost of debt capital. Our study 
distinguishes between ESG performance that is used to indicate an effective commitment to 
ESG, and ESG disclosure that represents an effort to construct an image of commitment 
designed to positively influence stakeholders’ perceptions. Supporting a version of legitimacy 
theory, we find that lending institutions value both ESG performance and disclosure and 
integrate ESG information in their credit decisions – in that firms with stronger ESG 
performance have a lower cost of debt, and ESG disclosure has an equal impact on the cost of 
debt as ESG performance. Although these findings suggest that the market (in context) can 
engender more desirable social outcomes by rewarding ESG practices, it fails to distinguish 
between ESG performance and disclosure (which may be contrasted as the more substantive 
and the more symbolic). Moreover, our results also reflect upon the importance of the role that 
civil society and the state play in addressing and exploring the limitations of free-market 
regimes. Specifically, we provide evidence that the impact of ESG performance and disclosure 
on the cost of debt is more dominant in the stakeholder-oriented countries (where the 
community is more prevalent). Our main findings are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests, 
including an alternative measure of the cost of debt, model specifications, and different 
approaches to address endogeneity. We acknowledge limitations in our research method but 
point nevertheless to its value in supporting a critical perspective and make suggestions for 
future research. 
 









Different groups of corporate stakeholders have been exercising pressure on firms to go beyond 
the legally required level of environmental, social and governance (ESG1) practices and 
improve their impact on the environment and society. This rising trend was found by the latest 
Nielsen Global Survey on Corporate Social Responsibility in 2015 which reveals that 66% of 
global consumers are willing to pay more for sustainable brands compared to 55% in 2014, and 
that 73% of global millennials are willing to pay extra for sustainable offerings compared to 
50% in 2014.2 In this regard, most market-based research nowadays argues that efficient 
implementation of ESG practices enhances corporate financial performance (Hillman and 
Keim, 2001; Birindelli et al., 2015; Hoepner et al., 2016), as it creates and maintains a corporate 
competitive advantage (Hart, 1995; Shrivastava, 1995; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Aragón-Correa, 
1998) by establishing long-term relationships with key corporate stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; 
Jones, 1995; Donaldson and Preston, 1995). According to a recent study by the United Nations, 
89% of CEOs from more than 100 countries believe that their commitment to ESG practices is 
translating into real impact in terms of the financial success of their firms (United Nations, 
2016). 
Despite this wide recognition of the importance of ESG practices and the many positive 
initiatives globally that have been in place in relation to social and environmental practices, the 
world is still suffering from social inequities, violence, lack of basic requirements of life, and 
the state of the environment in general seems to be getting worse (Deegan, 2017). We believe 
this deterioration in the state of the environment and societies, in general, is the responsibility 
of business firms and governments and their failure to fulfil their obligations. As Deegan and 
Shelly (2014) point out, governments tend to believe that social and environmental practices 
should remain voluntary and be determined by market forces (in context) and take the side of 
business firms when it comes to debates about extending corporate accountability. A striking 
example of governments taking the side of firms at the expense of the wider community is how 
the United States President Donald Trump views the climate change treaty. He stated that this 
treaty would undermine the US economy and puts US firms at a permanent disadvantage. In 
                                                 
1 The terms CSR and ESG are used interchangeably in this paper. 








2017, Donald Trump announced that the US participation in the 2015 Paris Agreement on 
climate change mitigation is suspended. Despite the increasingly deteriorating state of the 
environment and societies, business firms predominantly oppose any attempts to make social 
and environmental practices compulsory (Owen et al., 2000; Deegan and Shelly, 2014). 
Similarly, social and environmental practices have been criticised in the social accounting 
literature for their lack of relevance and for their failure to affect sustainable development 
(Gray, 2010; Husillos et al., 2011). 
This debate across the social accounting and market-based literature could be linked to the 
organisational legitimacy theory of Ashforth and Gibbs (1990). They identify two approaches 
firms follow regarding social and environmental disclosure: (1) The substantive approach, 
according to which social and environmental disclosure reflects actual changes in firms’ 
activities; (2) the symbolic approach, which involves the portrayal of firms’ behaviour to show 
the firms to be consistent with social norms while their actual performance and policies may 
not change (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). Firms follow the second approach mainly to convince 
their key stakeholders, including lending institutions, to believe that they are committed to 
societal expectations irrespective of the extent to which it actually is or not (Michelon et al., 
2015). Empirically, there has been a lack of research on which approach (substantive versus 
symbolic) firms follow to disclose their social and environmental performance. Most social 
accounting literature links social and environmental disclosure to the symbolic approach 
(Patten, 2002; Cho and Patten, 2007), while most of the market-based research links social and 
environmental disclosure to the substantive approach (Cormier and Magnan, 2007; Clarkson 
et al., 2008; Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Moser and Martin, 2012; Ge and Liu, 2015; Stellner et al., 
2015; Erragragui, 2017).  
These two contrasting views have motivated a sizeable amount of research on the economic 
consequences of ESG practices. There is, however, a scarcity of studies that examine the impact 
of ESG practices on the cost of debt (Erragragui, 2017). Consequently, little is known on 
whether lending institutions care about both ESG performance and disclosure of borrowing 
firms, and whether the effect of ESG disclosure in the absence of ESG performance (the 
symbolic approach) has a significant impact on lending institutions. Prior studies examining 
the association between ESG practices and the cost of debt either focused on a single country 







Hoepner et al., 2016; Jung et al., 2018; Stellner et al., 2015). Also, they used either ESG 
performance or ESG disclosure exchangeably as a measure of ESG practices. However, we 
believe that these two measures of ESG practices are different. While ESG performance 
measures what firms actually do, ESG disclosure is the communication of their ESG 
performance (Deegan, 2017), which respectively could be seen as the substantive approach and 
the symbolic approach. 
Drawing on legitimacy theory, our study empirically examines the impact of firms’ ESG 
performance and disclosure on their cost of debt, and whether ESG disclosure has a moderating 
effect on the relationship between ESG performance and the cost of debt using a large sample 
obtained from 15 countries in the EU. We believe that ESG practices represent a crucial factor 
in determining the creditworthiness of a firm by lending institutions. We argue that lending 
institutions incorporate firms’ ESG information in their lending decision to evaluate two types 
of risks imposed by these firms: default risk3 and reputational risk4 (Weber et al., 2010; Weber 
et al., 2014). Therefore, integrating information on a firm’s ESG practices may mitigate these 
risks, reducing the cost of debt charged to that firm by lending institutions.  
Moreover, firms’ practices are regulated by a whole series of forces that are never separate 
from each other, but these forces, such as the state, the market and community, can vary in 
their influence between contexts (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985). According to institutional 
theory, organisations adapting their processes to be aligned with externally codified rules, 
norms, or laws and with best practices in the sector (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Thus, ESG 
practices are shaped by deep-seated institutions rather than only by organisational-level micro-
factors. In such a setting, we argue that country’ sustainability settings will determine the level 
of ESG performance and disclosure, as well as the market reward of these practices. To help 
better understand and define the impact of institutional forces on the relationship between the 
cost of debt and both ESG performance and disclosure, we investigate whether country 
sustainability characteristics, which can represent those forces, have a moderating effect on the 
relationship between firms’ ESG practices and their cost of debt. Prior studies fail to control 
                                                 
3 Default risk is the risk of losing the principal amount of the loan, in addition to any remediation costs that the 
lending institution has to carry Thompson, P. & Cowton, C. J. (2004) Bringing the environment into bank 
lending: implications for environmental reporting. The British Accounting Review, 36(2), 197-218.. 








for country sustainability characteristics while examining this relationship. Therefore, it is not 
clear in prior studies whether country sustainability characteristics affect the relationship 
between the cost of debt and both ESG performance and disclosure.  
This study contributes to the existing literature in different ways. First, it adds to the limited 
number of prior studies that examine the impact of firms’ ESG performance and disclosure on 
their cost of debt, which provide conflicting results (Ye and Zhang, 2011; Aman and Nguyen, 
2013; Hoepner et al., 2016; Crifo et al., 2017; Erragragui, 2017; Hasan et al., 2017). Using a 
sample of 6,018 firm-year observations of listed firms in the EU from 2005 to 2016, we find a 
significant negative association between the cost of debt and both ESG performance and 
disclosure. This finding sheds light on the significant role of ESG practices nowadays in 
lending institutions’ creditworthiness valuation models. If lending institutions were to demand 
more ESG information, their relatively powerful position could motivate firms to strengthen 
their ESG performance and disclosure, which will be of benefit to other stakeholder groups.  
Second, this study benefits from a unique data set obtained from the DataStream (ESG-
ASSET4) and Bloomberg databases, which allows measuring both ESG performance and 
disclosure for the same firm sample list. In contrast to prior studies that examine the impact of 
ESG performance solely on the cost of debt, this study examines the impact of both ESG 
performance and disclosure. We believe that the two measures of ESG practices are different. 
While ESG performance refers to the actual ESG-related activities conducted by the firm, ESG 
disclosure is the channel through which it announces these activities to its stakeholders. 
Disclosure can support the substantive approach or the symbolic approach. Therefore, we 
extend the contribution of this study by investigating the moderating effect of ESG disclosure 
on the relationship between ESG performance and the cost of debt. In this regard, we report 
evidence that ESG disclosure acts as a substitute, rather than as a compliment, to ESG 
performance in decreasing firms’ cost of debt. This indicates that firms with poor ESG 
performance try to increase ESG disclosure to compensate (the symbolic approach). We 
provide evidence that ESG disclosure is more likely to be undertaken as a symbolic approach 
in the EU market, which is consistent with the social accounting literature in concluding that 
CSR disclosure is a tool to manage corporate image, instead of a substantive improvement in 
the accountability process (Moneva et al., 2006; Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007; Hopwood, 







Third, in addition to using a comprehensive measure of ESG performance and disclosure, this 
study offers isolation of the impact of the individual dimensions of ESG performance and 
disclosure on the cost of debt. Mattingly (2017) point out the importance of using individual 
dimensions of ESG practices, in addition to a comprehensive measure, to capture the impact 
on the cost of debt. We provide evidence that lending institutions do value individual 
dimensions of ESG performance and disclosure, with the environmental dimension having the 
largest impact on the cost of debt.  
Finally, this study contributes to the existing literature by investigating the moderating effect 
of country sustainability characteristics on the relationship between ESG practices and the cost 
of debt. While most of the prior research has focused mainly on country sustainability 
characteristics as a driver of ESG performance or disclosure (e.g., Jackson and Apostolakou, 
2010; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012), our study addresses its role in affecting the anticipated 
benefits of ESG performance and disclosure. We provide evidence that the impact of ESG 
performance and disclosure on the cost of debt is more obvious in countries that are more 
stakeholder-oriented. By doing so, we add to our understanding of how country sustainability 
characteristics explain the variations in the benefits associated with ESG practices. Also, this 
finding is consistent with the institutional theory that documents the significant role of 
institutional factors. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
perspectives on ESG practices, then reviews prior studies and develops hypotheses. Section 3 
explains the methodology of the study. Section 4 discusses the main tests and results, in 
addition to robustness tests conducted. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
2. Theoretical framework on ESG practices 
The academic debate on whether CSR practices have positive or negative economic 
consequences on firms started more than 50 years ago. During this period of time, different 
theories have been used to explain CSR practices such as agency, stakeholder, legitimacy and 
institutional theories. On one side, in 1958, Levitt expressed his concerns about firms’ CSR 
practices and pointed out that “welfare and society are not the corporation’s business. Its 
business is making money, not sweet music” (Levitt, 1958, p.47). This perspective is consistent 







performance of the borrowing firm to estimate its default risk (Devalle et al., 2017). According 
to Levitt (1958), lending institutions are interested in verifiable and objective information, such 
as profitability, leverage, and liquidity of the borrowing firm to ensure its ability to repay the 
debt. Levitt’s perspective was supported by Hemingway and Maclagan (2004) who point out 
that a motivation for engaging in CSR practices is “greenwashing" to cover up for corporate 
misbehaviour. This, in turn, results in a riskier profile and a higher cost of debt for these firms 
(Jensen and Smith, 1985). On the other side, theories and recent empirical studies supporting 
the notion that ESG practices and firm profitability are not inversely related have started to 
emerge (Scholtens, 2006; Scholtens, 2009; Zeidan et al., 2015), indicating that firms’ 
profitability is no longer enough for lending institutions to make their credit decisions 
(Birindelli et al., 2015; Hoepner et al., 2016).  
Based on legitimacy theory, firms continually aim to ensure that they are perceived as operating 
within the bounds and norms of their societies (Deegan and Unerman, 2011). So, firms attempt 
to ensure that their activities are perceived by externals as being legitimate. Therefore, firms 
should adopt practices that are able to influence societal appraisal to increase their legitimacy 
such as social and environmental practices including real activities and/or disclosure 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Deephouse, 1996; Suchman, 1995). In this regard, Neu et al. 
(1998), who use an impression management lens that can be linked to legitimacy theory, 
suggest that financial stakeholders such as banks are the most important stakeholder to the 
firms and that disclosures will be primarily tailored towards them in order to more effectively 
meet their needs. 
It is argued in the literature that society progressively assumes that firms will “... make outlays 
to repair or prevent damage to the physical environment, to ensure the health and safety of 
consumers, employees, and those who reside in the communities where products are 
manufactured and wastes are dumped ...” (Tinker and Neimark, 1987, p. 84). Therefore, firms 
with a poor ESG performance might find it difficult to get the necessary support and resources 
to continue working in a community that values ESG practices, e.g., higher cost of debt. 
Legitimacy theory emphasises that firms should consider the rights of the public at large, not 
merely those of its investors. Failure to comply with societal expectations might lead to 







operations, or provide the firm with limited resources (e.g., higher cost of debt capital) (Deegan 
and Unerman, 2011). 
While ESG disclosure is growing significantly in recent years, a clear debate has grown in the 
literature about the motivation behind adopting a specific ESG disclosure approach (e.g., Neu 
et al., 1998; Lewis and Unerman, 1999; Kolk et al., 2008; Ball and Craig, 2010; Burritt and 
Schaltegger, 2010; Cho et al., 2012a; Cho et al., 2015). This debate can be referenced to two 
main approaches. Firstly, the substantive management approach, which explains that the 
motivation for adopting ESG disclosure strategy is to gain legitimacy through real changes in 
the firms’ actions through aligning their strategies to social norms. However, the second 
approach, named symbolic management approach, in which firms are engaging in apparent 
actions to affect stakeholders’ perceptions (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). Engaging in those 
apparent actions lead stakeholders to believe that firms are committed to societal requirements 
(Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). Based on this approach, firms with weak ESG performance tend 
to increase their level of ESG disclosure above their actual ESG performance (greenwashing) 
to gain the benefits associated with ESG practices, e.g., lower cost of debt. In this regard, recent 
research argues that firms use hypocrisy strategies to manage different stakeholder interests to 
maintain legitimacy (Brunsson, 2007; Cho et al., 2015). In other words, firms maintain 
legitimacy through ‘‘camouflaging” their practices (Michelon et al., 2016). This framework 
offers a rich theoretical lens to explore how lending institutions as a main stakeholder group 
perceive ESG performance and disclosure. Therefore, whether ESG practices are used under a 
substantive or symbolic approach is, therefore, remains an open question.  
Within the substantive approach, it is expected to find that ESG disclosure acts as a compliment 
to ESG performance as it is driven by honest interest to improve transparency, the quality of 
information communicated and improve stakeholders’ engagement process. However, within 
the symbolic approach, it is expected to find evidence that ESG disclosure acts as a substitute, 
rather a compliment, to ESG performance as disclosure might be used to show firms as 
‘‘committed’’ (Guidry et al., 2012), and disclosure used here to facilitate the construction of 
an inaccurate company image (Hopwood, 2009).  
Although stakeholder and legitimacy theories have been adopted as popular explanations of 







al., 1995; Spence et al., 2010; Deegan, 2010). Gray et al. (1995) delineate stakeholder and 
legitimacy theories as concerned with the legitimacy of firms whereas the institutional theory 
is defined as concerned with the legitimacy of the system. In this regard, ESG practices are 
viewed as “a social phenomenon that emerges from the actions and interactions of agents 
within a complex set of forces, including external economic forces and related ideologies, 
national economic conditions, state policies” (Ahmed and Uddin, 2018, p. 2211). Given its 
societal orientation, ESG practices may be explained as an embedded practice shaped by deep-
seated institutions rather than only by organisational-level micro-factors.  
Prior studies have provided evidence that diverse institutional contexts lead to a variation in 
firm-level ESG performance and disclosure (e.g., Ahmed and Uddin, 2018; Baldini et al., 
2018). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) theorised that organisations adapting their processes to 
nourish their legitimacy through the adoption of coercive (i.e. alignment with externally 
codified rules, laws, or norms), mimetic (i.e. alignment with best practices or managerial 
fads/fashions) or normative isomorphism (i.e. alignment with espoused standards set by 
educational/professional authorities). For instance, Matten and Moon (2008) document that 
pertinent social obligations are seen in Europe as the purview of government whereas US-style 
ESG practices are characterised by less regulation and more incentive and opportunity for 
business organisations to fill social niches.  
In such a setting, decisions regarding ESG issues are framed vis a vis a broader social context 
and thereby the level of ESG performance and disclosure, as well as the market reward of these 
practices, vary across countries because of the diversity in the institutional settings (Jackson 
and Apostolakou, 2010; Baldini et al., 2018). In particular, we argue that the market will reward 
ESG practices when stakeholder orientation 'community' is more prevalent. By doing so, our 
study contributes to not only the existing academic debate around ESG practices but also 








3. Hypothesis development   
3.1 The impact of ESG performance and disclosure on the cost of debt  
The growing attention paid to ESG issues5 has led to an increase in lending institutions’ 
awareness of reputational risk imposed by borrowing firms in addition to default risk. This 
means that lending institutions can be perceived by society as facilitators of negative ESG 
practices conducted by borrowing firms, resulting in adverse stakeholder reactions to these 
lending institutions. These risks represent incentives for lending institutions to integrate ESG 
information into their creditworthiness evaluation process.  
The recognition of this link by lending institutions and other stakeholder groups increased since 
many lending institutions around the world signed the United Nations Environment 
Programme’s Statement by Banks on the Environment and Sustainable Development (UNEP, 
2012). Thereafter, lending institutions started to integrate ESG information in their internal 
operations by including it in their checklist for risk assessment and management. Thompson 
and Cowton (2004) find that 60% of banks in the UK had a formal corporate lending policy 
which incorporated ESG considerations. Furthermore, the increasing awareness of ESG 
practices by society also provides lending institutions with an opportunity to make their ESG 
stance central to their activities or brands (Thompson and Cowton, 2004; Weber et al., 2014). 
For example, the Co-operative Bank in the UK declined to grant loan facilities to business 
clients due to ESG concerns (Kitson, 1996). Zeidan et al. (2015) also point out that 
incorporating ESG information in a bank’s credit granting policy creates a long-term presence 
on the market by emphasising its own contribution to the environmental quality and society. 
Despite the worldwide recognition of the importance of ESG practices by firms, their impact 
on the cost of debt in academia is still a controversial issue. On the one hand, some studies 
provide evidence of the inverse relationship between ESG performance and the cost of debt 
(Hasan et al., 2017; Ge and Liu, 2015; Goss and Roberts, 2011; Ye and Zhang, 2011; Crifo et 
al., 2017) On the other hand, other studies find an insignificant or even a positive relationship 
between ESG performance and the cost of debt (Erragragui, 2017; Stellner et al., 2015; 
Hoepner et al., 2016). The conceptual link between ESG disclosure and the cost of debt is even 
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more obvious. ESG disclosure is different from ESG performance because it provides 
additional information, such as, a risk management framework that demonstrates the firms’ 
awareness of their ESG weaknesses and how it is going to mitigate their negative impacts. For 
example, Jung et al. (2016) find that lending institutions incorporate a firm’s exposure to 
carbon-related risk into lending decisions, and that the impact of that risk on increasing its cost 
of debt is mitigated when the firm shows awareness of the risk and willingness to decrease 
through disclosure of plans for new capital investments using green technology. Furthermore, 
a higher level of ESG disclosure is linked to lower information asymmetry between borrowing 
firms and lending institutions, and hence lowers the cost of debt. In a similar vein, Dennis and 
Mullineaux (2000) point out that as information about the borrowing firm becomes more 
transparent, the debt contract becomes more saleable. Aman and Nguyen (2013) find that firms 
can mitigate agency conflicts and reduce risk to debtholders by lowering information 
asymmetry through a higher level of disclosure.  
Although this conceptual link between ESG disclosure and the cost of debt is clear, there is a 
scarcity of empirical studies that examine this association. Of particular importance to our 
study, Dhaliwal et al. (2011a) examine internal control disclosure by 577 US-listed firms as a 
mechanism of corporate governance and its impact on the cost of debt. They provide evidence 
that disclosure of corporate governance material weaknesses results in increased cost of debt. 
Gao et al. (2016) examine disclosure level of corporate social responsibility by 61 firms listed 
on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange between 2004 and 2012 and found an inverse relationship 
between corporate social responsibility disclosure and the cost of debt. Based on the above 
discussion, we posit the following two hypotheses: 
H1a: There is a negative relationship between firms’ ESG performance and their cost of debt. 
H1b: There is a negative relationship between firms’ ESG disclosure and their cost of debt. 
 
3.2 The moderating effect of ESG disclosure on the relationship between ESG 
performance and the cost of debt.   
While accounting standards require specific ESG information to be disclosed in the annual 







etc.), the significant portion of ESG disclosure remains voluntary and unregulated (Fatemi et 
al., 2017; Nazari et al., 2017). This has resulted in variations in the level of ESG disclosure by 
firms. A large percentage of these variations is determined by ESG performance as a major 
determinant of the ESG disclosure policy adopted by firms. Many studies find a significant 
association between the two components of ESG practices (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson 
et al., 2008). As mentioned in the theoretical framework section, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) 
determine two approaches that firms follow regarding social and environmental disclosure. 
Firms use the substantive approach to pose themselves in the market as being committed to a 
strong ESG performance and distinguish themselves from poor ESG performers (Cahan et al., 
2016). However, the lack of regulation of ESG disclosure provides managers with an 
opportunity to deliberately manipulate their ESG disclosure to signal high ESG commitment 
when their ESG performance is actually poor (the symbolic approach). For example, Nazari et 
al. (2017) find that firms listed on the S&P 500 index with poor ESG performance intensify 
their ESG disclosure by using more complex syntax that is difficult to understand, aiming to 
impress readers in order to hide poor performance. Also, Michelon et al. (2015) find that UK 
listed firms tend to dilute information in their CSR stand-alone report with other pieces of 
irrelevant information, portraying the firm as CSR committed and camouflaging important 
items of its disclosure. Other studies, in contrast, argue that managers might fear that investors 
would punish them for the high costs of ESG practices. Therefore, managers choose to 
understate their actual ESG performance (brownwashing) (see Kim and Lyon, 2014). 
Prior studies provide mixed results on the relationship between ESG performance and ESG 
disclosure, with the majority indicating a positive relationship (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; 
Clarkson et al., 2008; Dhaliwal et al., 2011b; Lyon and Maxwell, 2011; Gao et al., 2016), while 
others find a negative relationship (Hughes et al., 2001; Patten, 2002). Therefore, this study 
extends the existing literature by providing insights into the effects of interplay between ESG 
performance and disclosure on the cost of debt, thereby shedding light on managers’ choices 
with respect to ESG performance and disclosure. Given the contradictory results driven by 
different managerial motives for ESG disclosure (the substantive approach vs the symbolic 
approach), we posit the following non-directional hypothesis: 
H2: The interaction between firms’ ESG performance and disclosure has a significant impact 







3.3 The moderating effect of country sustainability characteristics on the relationship 
between ESG practices and the cost of debt.   
It has been established that country sustainability characteristics play a vital role in driving 
firms’ behaviour, based on the notion that firms are embedded in a broad set of political and 
economic institutions (Campbell, 2007; Aguilera et al., 2007). Prior literature documents that 
country sustainability characteristics affect financial reporting practices and the related 
outcomes (Ball et al., 2000; Ball, 2006; Leuz, 2010; Byard et al., 2011; Ahmed et al., 2013; 
Manganaris et al., 2015; Christensen et al., 2016). Regarding ESG performance and disclosure, 
Baldini et al. (2016) report evidence that country-level characteristics, such as legal framework, 
and cultural system significantly affect firms’ ESG disclosure. Likewise, drawing from 
institutional theory, Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) reveal that the country’s financial and 
political system, as well as the education and labour system, have effects on firms’ social and 
environmental performance. Furthermore, Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) document that 
firms from Anglo-Saxon countries provide higher CSR disclosures than firms in Continental 
Europe. 
In fact, there is still ongoing debate regarding the effects of the interaction between institutional 
factors and corporate reporting practices on the anticipated economic consequences (Li, 2010; 
Daske et al., 2008; Ahmed et al., 2013; Moscariello et al., 2014; Manganaris et al., 2015; 
Christensen et al., 2016). Daske et al. (2008) find that the capital-market benefits (market 
liquidity and the cost of capital) following IFRS adoption occurred only in countries where 
legal enforcement is strong. Likewise, Manganaris et al. (2015) reveal that banks from 
countries characterised by strong enforcement show greater value relevance after the adoption 
of IFRS compared to other banks from countries characterised by weak enforcement.  
In contrast, Houqe et al. (2014) find a stronger relationship between IFRS and accounting 
quality in countries with low levels of investor protection. Also, Ahmed et al. (2013) find that 
the enforcement regime does not affect accounting quality and related consequences if the 
regulations are looser and permit more managerial discretion. Likewise, Moscariello et al. 
(2014) find that the mandatory adoption of IFRS has a significant positive relationship with the 
debt-contracting process in Italy, which is characterised by a weak investor protection system, 







Florou and Kosi (2015) find that the reported debt market benefits are present even for EU 
countries that did not experience concurrent financial reporting enforcement or other 
institutional reforms. In particular, Dhaliwal et al. (2012) find that CSR disclosure is associated 
with more accurate earnings forecast in countries where stakeholder groups such as employees, 
consumers, governments, and communities are likely to have greater influences on firms’ 
operational decisions. In a further study, Dhaliwal et al. (2014) indicate that the negative 
association between the cost equity capital and CSR disclosure is more obvious in stakeholder-
oriented countries.6 Thus, we expect the impact of ESG practices on the cost of debt to be 
greater in countries that are more sustainable. Therefore, the following hypotheses are 
generated.  
H3a: The anticipated negative impact of ESG performance on the cost of debt is greater in more 
sustainable countries. 
H3b: The anticipated negative impact of ESG disclosure on the cost of debt is greater in more 
sustainable countries. 
4. Research design  
4.1 Variables measurement 
4.1.1 ESG performance (ESG-perform) and ESG disclosure (ESG-disclose)  
This study investigates the impact of ESG practices on the cost of debt. Two commonly used 
proxies of ESG practices are available; Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg ESG ratings. While 
Thomson Reuters ESG ratings, collected from the DataStream (ESG-ASSET4), represent a 
metric of ESG performance, Bloomberg focuses on a firm’s level of ESG disclosure (Ioannou 
and Serafeim, 2012; Baldini et al., 2016; Fatemi et al., 2017). Thomson Reuters ESG ratings 
are designed to measure a company’s relative ESG performance, commitment, and 
effectiveness across three main dimensions that cover 10 themes. These dimensions are 
environmental (resource use, emissions, and innovation), social (workforce, human rights, 
community, and product responsibility) and governance (management, shareholders, and CSR 
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strategy). They are considered a comprehensive evaluation of the company’s sustainability 
impact and conduct based on the reported data in the public domain, and Thomson Reuters 
ESG controversy score (Thomson Reuters, 2017).7 In contrast, ESG disclosure ratings, using 
the Bloomberg database index, are based on the information available in firms’ annual reports, 
corporate social responsibility reports, and on their websites. Bloomberg ESG disclosure scores 
rate companies annually based on their disclosure of quantitative and policy-related ESG data 
(Huber and Comstock, 2017). Bloomberg ESG data includes 120 ESG indicators (e.g., carbon 
emissions, climate change effect, pollution, renewable energy, political contributions, 
discrimination, diversity, community relations, and human rights). Moreover, both Thomson 
Reuters and Bloomberg provide a score for the three individual dimensions [Environmental 
(E), Social (S), and Governance (G)] to measure ESG performance and the level of its related 
disclosure.  
To test the interaction effects between ESG performance and ESG disclosure, we transform the 
ESG disclosure score to a dummy variable. We first calculate the median of ESG disclosure 
every year, then we give the value of one if firms have higher ESG disclosure score than the 
median, and zero otherwise. 
4.1.2 The cost of debt (CoD) 
Our main tests examine whether ESG performance and disclosure affect the cost of debt. To 
measure the cost of debt, we use the accounting measure, calculated as the ratio of a firm’s 
interest expense to its average debt (Francis et al., 2005; Gray et al., 2009). A meta-analysis 
conducted by Orlitzky et al. (2003) find that ESG performance is more correlated to 
accounting-based measures than to market-based measures. Also, credit ratings based on the 
evaluation of the Fitch agency is used as a robustness measure of the cost of debt. Previous 
empirical studies have established a relationship between ESG practices and credit ratings as a 
proxy for the cost of debt. For example, Bauer and Hann (2010) find that legal, reputational, 
and regulatory risks associated with environmental incidents lead to lower credit ratings. Also, 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) indicate that credit ratings are affected by corporate governance 
mechanisms. Other studies used a comprehensive measure of corporate social responsibility 
                                                 










and found that better corporate social responsibility performance is associated with better credit 
ratings (Ge and Liu, 2015; Oikonomou et al., 2014; Devalle et al., 2017).  
4.1.3 Control variables 
Based on prior studies, there are four control variables consistently found to be significantly 
related to the cost of debt. These variables are the firm size (Size), leverage (LEV), return on 
assets (ROA), and interest coverage rate (IntCov). We measure Size as a natural logarithm of 
total assets in year t. We expect to find a negative relationship between Size and the cost of 
debt. Firms with large Size are expected to have more resources for external finance at a lower 
cost than those with small Size (Erragragui, 2017; Hasan et al., 2017). LEV is the ratio of total 
debt to total assets in year t. We expect to find a positive association between LEV and the cost 
of debt. Those firms with lower level of LEV are expected to have better solvency and lower 
interest rate than firms with higher level of LEV (Tran, 2014; Jung et al., 2016; Goh et al., 2016; 
Erragragui, 2017). ROA is the net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. A 
negative association is also expected between ROA and the cost of debt. Firms with high ROA 
are in better financial position and often acquire loans with lower interest rates (Aman and 
Nguyen, 2013; Ge and Liu, 2015; Arena, 2018). IntCov is the total operating income divided 
by total interest expense. IntCov is a measure of a firm’s capabilities to pay its interest. So, it 
is likely that firms with a higher rate of interest coverage to have a lower cost of debt (Francis 
et al., 2005; Gray et al., 2009; Hoepner et al., 2016; Erragragui, 2017). Moreover, our study 
uses a combined proxy for country sustainability characteristics (Stake) developed by Dhaliwal 
et al. (2012) to measure the legal and social norms of different countries. This proxy is based 
on attributes highlighted by the stakeholder theory describing the relative importance of 
stakeholder groups such as power, legitimacy, and salience as in Mitchell et al. (1997).  This 
proxy is the principal factor of four attributes related to assessing the legal environment of a 
country in protecting labour, the existence of country’s environmental laws and regulations, 
the level of public awareness of corporate social responsibility issues, and surveys of the views 
of corporate executive officers on corporate social activities.8 All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
 
                                                 







4.2 Data and sample 
The sample consists of all non-financial firms in 15 EU countries. Due to inadequate 
observations, the remaining EU countries have been excluded. Although Norway is not a 
member of the EU, it has been added to the sample because it applies the same accounting 
standards and regulations as other EU countries. In total, the final sample consists of 6,018 
firm-year observations covering the period from 2005 to 2016. In order to avoid any 
survivorship bias, we include both active and dead equities in our sample. We use Thomson 
Reuters Asset4 database for both ESG performance and credit ratings. We also use the 
Bloomberg database for ESG disclosure ratings and Thomson Reuters DataStream for both the 
cost of debt and control variables. Table 1 reports the number of firms per industry and country. 
Panel A in table 1 shows that all industries are well represented in the sample. Approximately 
31.2% of the sample comprises firms from the manufacturing sector, while 21.4% are from 
utilities, 15.1% from retail, 6.1% from health care services, 5.4% from information technology, 
and 7.5% from mining and oil and gas. Furthermore, panel B in table 1 shows that all countries 
of the EU are well represented in the sample with the three major economies in Europe (UK, 
France and Germany) comprising 63.4% of the total sample. 
[Insert table 1 here] 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics regarding the primary variables; ESG performance, 
ESG disclosure, the cost of debt, and firm characteristics for the final sample. All continuous 
variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% percentiles. The average of ESG performance is 
0.66 and the median is 0.76. The average of ESG disclosure is 0.36, and the median is 0.36. 
The mean (median) of the cost of debt is 0.06 (0.05). Mean of LEV is 0.25 and median is 0.24. 
Mean of Size is 15 and median is 15. Mean of IntCov is 34.7 and median is 6.5. The values of 
these variables seem realistic because they fall within the bounds of estimates reported in prior 
literature (e.g., Francis et al., 2005; Gray et al., 2009; Erragragui, 2017). Also, table 2 reports 
information on other variables. The average of total assets is $11,000 million, and median of 
total assets is $3,000 million; mean of sales is $8,300 million, and median of sales is $2,500 
million. 







Table 3 reports the correlations among the primary variables. It is noted that the cost of debt is 
negatively correlated with both ESG performance and its related disclosure. Also, it is 
negatively correlated with Size, ROA and IntCov, and positively correlated with LEV, which is 
consistent with prior studies (Francis et al., 2005; Gray et al., 2009; Goh et al., 2016; 
Erragragui, 2017; Arena, 2018). Regarding ESG performance, table 3 shows that it is 
negatively correlated with LEV and IntCov. Also, the table shows that ESG performance is 
positively correlated with ESG disclosure, country stakeholder orientation (Stake), Size, and 
ROA which are consistent with prior studies (Francis et al., 2005; Gray et al., 2009; Goh et al., 
2016; Erragragui, 2017; Arena, 2018).  
Moreover, the correlation between ESG performance and disclosure is high (0.61) but far from 
a perfect correlation suggesting that ESG performance and disclosure capture different 
attributes of ESG ratings.9 This finding is consistent with prior studies that found a correlation 
between disclosure and performance. For example, Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) find that good 
environmental performance is positively associated with good environmental disclosure. In a 
recent study, Nazari et al. (2017) examine the relationship between the complexity of corporate 
social responsibility disclosure and actual corporate social responsibility performance. They 
find a positive association between actual corporate social responsibility performance and 
readability and the level of corporate social responsibility disclosure. Indeed, the correlation 
coefficient also suggests that for at least some companies the ESG performance and disclosure 
are negatively correlated or at least not correlated. Therefore, the use of both attributes will 
provide a clear understanding of the anticipated impact of ESG practices on the cost of debt. 
[Insert table 3 here] 
5. Main tests and results 
In this section, we present three sets of tests to examine the association between ESG practices 
and the cost of debt. First, we examine the impact of ESG performance and disclosure along 
with individual dimensions on the cost of debt. Second, we examine the moderating effect of 
                                                 









ESG disclosure on the association between ESG performance and the cost of debt. Finally, we 
examine the moderating effect of country sustainability characteristics on the association 
between ESG practices and the cost of debt. Table 4 presents the estimated results for the main 
models, which is based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors pooled regression. This 
type of regression is designed to mitigate the problems of autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity effects.  
5.1 ESG practices the cost of debt   
We propose that ESG practices are negatively associated with the cost of debt. We examine 
the following regression model between ESG performance score, the cost of debt and a set of 
control variables: 
CoDi,t = α + β1Sizei,t + β2LEVi,t + β3ROAi,t + β4IntCovi,t + 
β5ESG
k
it + β6Stakei,t + β7YearFixedEffectt + 
β8IndustryFixedEffecti + vi,t 
 (Equation 1) 
 
where:  
CoD is the cost of debt calculated as the ratio of a firm’s interest expense to the average debt; 
Size is a natural logarithm of total assets; 
LEV is total debt of a firm deflated by total assets; 
ROA is net income before extraordinary items deflated by total assets; 
IntCov is total operating income deflated by total interest expense; 
ESG is the score of ESG practices; K represents either ESG performance or ESG disclosure. 
Stake is the average of a country-level score of stakeholders orientation developed by Dhaliwal 
et al. (2012) with a higher value indicating greater stakeholders orientation.  
Following Francis et al. (2005), we include the firm characteristics that are reported to be 
affecting the cost of debt. Along with ESG-perform and ESG-disclose, we include Size, LEV, 
ROA, IntCov, and Stake. Table 4 column 1 reports the results of estimating equation 1 using 
ESG-perform as an independent variable. The results show a significant negative association 
between ESG performance and the cost of debt. The estimated coefficient of ESG-perform is 
0.011 and is statistically significant at 1% level (t-statistics 2.76). Consistent with our 
prediction, the result indicates that firms with higher ESG performance have a lower cost of 







of interest that lending institutions are willing to receive for a pound of debt for such firms 
decreases. This means that lending institutions do integrate information about ESG 
performance of borrowing firms when evaluating their risk profile in their lending decision 
model, which is consistent with previous studies (Goss and Roberts, 2011; Nandy and Lodh, 
2012; Aman and Nguyen, 2013; Ge and Liu, 2015; Hasan et al., 2017; Crifo et al., 2017) and 
thus supports the first hypothesis (H1). 
[Insert table 4 here] 
Moving to control variables, we find that the signs of their coefficients are largely consistent 
with findings in the existing literature (e.g., Francis et al., 2005; Gray et al., 2009; Erragragui, 
2017)). In particular, the results show significant negative associations between the cost of debt 
and Size, ROA and IntCov. Firms with high IntCov have lower cost of debt, and large firms 
have relatively lower cost of debt compared to small firms (Erragragui, 2017; Hasan et al., 
2017). Also, the results show that firms with high LEV have higher cost of debt (Tran, 2014; 
Goh et al., 2016; Jung et al., 2016; Erragragui, 2017). Finally, the results show that the cost of 
debt is lower for firms from countries with greater stakeholders orientation such as Denmark 
than for those firms from countries with lower stakeholders orientation such as Greece 
(Mitchell et al., 1997; Dhaliwal et al., 2012).  
We decompose the total score of ESG performance into their individual dimensions, which are 
the environmental, the social, and the governance dimensions and test the associations between 
these dimensions and the cost of debt. Table 5 (panels A) reports the results of estimating 
equation one after replacing the ESG performance score with its individual dimensions. We 
find a significant negative association between the cost of debt and both the environmental and 
social dimensions, but not the corporate governance dimension, of ESG performance. The 
environmental dimension has the largest impact on the cost of debt with a coefficient of -0.012 
(t-statistics -3.41), then the social dimension with a coefficient of -0.012 (t-statistics -3.18). 
The inverse relationship between the environmental and social dimensions of ESG 
performance and the cost of debt is consistent with prior studies. For example, Hasan et al. 
(2017) find that higher levels of social capital incur lower bank loan spreads. Jung et al. (2018) 
find that the environmental impact of high carbon emissions is related to a higher cost of debt. 
Also, Nandy and Lodh (2012) find that a more eco-friendly firm gets a more favourable loan 







examines the impact of environmental and corporate governance dimensions of corporate 
social responsibility performance. He reports a negative impact for good performance in 
corporate governance on the cost of debt. However, similar to our finding, he reports an 
insignificant relationship for weaknesses of corporate governance. The insignificant 
relationship between the corporate governance dimension and the cost of debt is inconsistent 
with prior studies that provide evidence that good governance is associated with higher credit 
ratings and lower cost of debt (Aman and Nguyen, 2013; Andrade et al., 2014; Erragragui, 
2017). 
We argue that the insignificant relationship between the corporate governance dimension and 
the cost of debt may be offset by the inverse relationship between the environmental and social 
dimensions and the cost of debt. We believe that lending institutions use the collective and 
integrative impact of the individual dimensions of ESG performance to determine the reliability 
and trustworthiness of the firm’s management team to make their lending decisions. Many 
authors emphasised the concept of management quality and its impact on the cost of debt, and 
how lending institutions take into account risk arising from good or poor management practices 
concluded from the individual dimensions of ESG performance (e.g., Rahaman and Al Zaman, 
2013). This finding suggests the need for further investigation of the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms and its impact on the cost of debt.  
Regarding ESG disclosure, table 4 column 2 reports the results of estimating equation 1 using 
ESG-disclose as an independent variable. In this regard, the results show a significant negative 
association between ESG disclosure and the cost of debt. In particular, the estimated coefficient 
of ESG-disclose is -0.024 and is statistically significant at 5% level (t-statistics -2.57), which 
is consistent with our prediction and previous studies. For example, using a comprehensive 
measure of corporate social responsibility disclosure, Gao et al. (2016) find an inverse 
relationship between corporate social responsibility disclosure and the cost of debt. These 
results provide evidence that actual ESG performance and its related disclosure have an impact 
on a firm’s ability to obtain external finance at a lower cost.  
Similar to ESG performance, we decompose the total score of ESG disclosure into its 
individual dimensions. Consistent with our expectations, results in table 5 (panel B) reveal that 







The environmental dimension of ESG disclosure has the largest impact on the cost of debt with 
a coefficient of -0.018 (t-statistics -2.41), followed by the corporate governance dimension with 
a coefficient of -0.018 (t-statistics -1.93). The social dimension has the lowest impact on the 
cost of debt with a coefficient of -0.016 (t-statistics -1.68). The largest impact of environmental 
performance and disclosure on the cost of debt indicates that lending institutions prioritise 
integrating environmental information in their creditworthiness evaluation process, and most 
likely for the purpose of evaluating the reputational risk associated with environmental issues 
imposed by borrowing firms. This finding suggests that firms struggling to finance their ESG 
practices due to limited resources should devote the largest portion of these resources to their 
environmental practices.   
[Insert table 5 here] 
In general, these findings are consistent with ESG practice-related theories supporting the 
notion that firms’ ESG practices enhance their financial performance. The negative relationship 
between ESG practices (performance and disclosure) and the cost of debt indicates that these 
practices help mitigate the agency conflict between shareholders and debtholders (Jensen and 
Smith, 1985). 
According to stakeholder theory, stewardship theory and transformational leadership theory, 
ESG practices are used by firms to send a strong signal to lending institutions about the 
efficiency and integrity of their management. This level of efficiency and integrity is indicated 
by a management’s decision to allocate part of a firm’s financial resources to satisfy the needs 
of different groups of corporate stakeholders (other than shareholders), while at the same time 
improving the financial performance of firms. This trustworthy behaviour by a firm’s 
management helps lending institutions better value the risk associated with their decisions that 
can increase the wealth of stockholders while reducing the wealth of debtholders (such as 
dividend payout, claim dilution, asset substitution and underinvestment), resulting in a lower 
cost of capital charged to a borrowing firm. Furthermore, ESG practices help reduce 
information asymmetry between borrowing firms and lending institutions by providing lending 
institutions with the ESG information necessary to make sure that they are not connected with 
business activities that have a negative impact on the environment or the broader society, and 







5.2 The moderating effect of ESG disclosure 
To test our second hypothesis that ESG disclosure has a moderating effect on the relationship 
between ESG performance and the cost of debt, we transform the ESG disclosure score to a 
dummy variable. We first calculate the median of ESG disclosure every year, then we give the 
value of one if firms have higher ESG disclosure score than the median and zero otherwise. 
Then, we include an interaction term between ESG-perform and this variable in our main 
regression. Our study expects a significant impact of ESG disclosure effect on the relationship 
between ESG performance and the cost of debt (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2011b; Lyon and Maxwell, 2011; Gao et al., 2016). 
 
CoDi,t = α + β1Sizei,t + β2LEVi,t + β3ROAi,t + β4IntCovi,t + β5ESG-
performit + β6ESG-discloseit + β7ESG-performit*ESG-
discloseit + β8Stakei,t + β9YearFixedEffectt + 
β10IndustryFixedEffecti + vi,t 
 (Equation 2) 
 
Consistent with H2, table 4 column 3 shows a significant effect of the ESG disclosure on the 
relationship between ESG performance and the cost of debt. The coefficient of                          
ESG-perform*ESG-disclose is significantly positive, albeit only at the 10% level (β= 0.023*). 
This suggests the existence of a substitution relationship between ESG performance and 
disclosure. More specifically, the ESG disclosure acts as a substitute for ESG performance and, 
therefore, compensate for low ESG performance suggesting that firms with low ESG 
performance tend to increase ESG disclosure to gain the benefits associated with ESG 
practices, e.g., lower cost of debt. This result is consistent with the notion that ESG disclosure 
is used by firms to enhance their reputation and to gain the benefits associated with ESG 
disclosure (Brown and Deegan, 1998; Cho and Patten, 2007; Dhaliwal et al., 2011b; Li et al., 
2018). This finding is also consistent with Fatemi et al. (2017) who find that firms with ESG 







who document a negative association between corporate social responsibility disclosures and 
the cost of debt only when corporate social responsibility performance is high.10 
5.3 The moderating effect of country sustainability characteristics 
To test our third hypothesis that country sustainability characteristics have a positive 
moderating effect on the relationship between both ESG performance and disclosure and the 
cost of debt, we include two-level interaction terms between stakeholder orientation (Stake) 
and both ESG performances and disclosure in our main regression. This interaction term 
captures the difference in the effects of ESG performance and disclosure on the cost of debt 
between those countries with greater or lower stakeholder orientation. Thus, we expect the 
impact of ESG practices on the cost of debt to be greater in countries that are more stakeholder-
oriented. 
 





it*Stakei,t + β8YearFixedEffectt + 
β9IndustryFixedEffecti + vi,t 
 (Equation 3) 
 
Columns 4 and 5 in table 4 show a significant effect of Stake on the relationship between both 
ESG-perform and ESG-disclose and the cost of debt. The two coefficients of the interaction 
are significant at 1% and 5% respectively (β = -0.015***,  β = -0.023***) suggesting that the 
impact of ESG performance and disclosure on the cost of debt are more obvious in countries 
that are more stakeholder-oriented. Thus, we accept the third hypothesis (H3). In this regard, 
the coefficient of ESG-perform*ESG-disclose is significantly positive, at the 10% level (β= 
0.021*) in column (4) and insignificantly positive in column (5). This supports the previous 
finding of a substitution relationship between ESG performance and ESG disclosure. These 
findings are in line with previous studies in that the variation in the benefits associated with 
ESG performance and disclosure, in the form of a lower cost of debt, is determined by the 
country sustainability characteristics (Ball et al., 2000; Ahmed et al., 2013; Christensen et al., 
2016; Capelle-Blancard et al., 2016). For instance, Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) find that 
                                                 
10Goa et al. (2015) used a sample of all public companies in the Netherlands and examined only corporate social 







country-level institutions drive social and environmental performance. Our study extends this 
to show that variations in the benefits associated with ESG performance and disclosure can be 
attributed to variation in the country sustainability characteristics. These findings are also 
consistent with institutional theory, in that organisations are embedded within broader social 
structures that influence both corporations’ decisions as well as stakeholders’ perceptions of 
ESG practices (Campbell, 2007; Aguilera et al., 2007; Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010). 
5.4 Robustness tests 
In this section, we report sensitivity tests that have been performed to examine whether our 
primary evidence on the association between ESG practices and the cost of debt is robust to 
alternative assumptions and model specifications. Overall, the results from these sensitivity 
tests are not quantitatively different from those of the primary analysis. First, we specify, in the 
main analysis, our dependent variable as the cost of debt, which is measured as the ratio of a 
firm’s interest expense to its average total debt. As an alternative proxy, we use credit ratings11 
instead of a firm’s interest rate as a measure of its cost of debt (Ge and Liu, 2015; Oikonomou 
et al., 2014; Devalle et al., 2017). We find a significant positive association between ESG 
performance and the credit ratings, which is consistent with the findings of the main analysis. 
However, we show that this relationship is stronger in the presence of ESG disclosure. Results 
are reported in table 6.  
 [Insert table 6 here] 
Secondly, similar to related ESG studies, one concern in relation to the analysis is the potential 
endogeneity and omitted variables bias, which may diminish the interpretation of the causal 
relationship between ESG and the cost of debt. For instance, although we control for important 
variables that affect the cost of debt, the evidence on the importance of ESG to debt pricing 
might be driven by omitted variables that are correlated with both ESG and the cost of debt. 
Also, a firm’s choice regarding whether to engage in ESG activities might not be independent 
of its cost of debt, in which case our analysis may be subject to reverse causality concerns (See 
                                                 
11 Credit rating variable has been collected from the Thomson Reuters Asset4 database which is based on Fitch 
Rating: (AAA (24 points); AA+ (23 points); AA (22 points); AA- (21 points); A+ (20 points); A (19 points); A- 
(18 points); BBB+ (17 points); BBB (16 points); BBB- (15 points); BB+ (14 points); BB (13 points); BB- (12 
points); B+ (11 points); B (10 points); B- (9 points); CCC+ (8 points); CCC (7 points); CCC- (6 points); CC+ (5 
points); CC (4 points); CC- (3 points); C (2 points); D (1 points); DD (1 points); DDD (1 points)). Then all 







Waddock and Graves, 1997). In particular, two approaches are used to ensure the robustness 
of our results to endogeneity and reverse causality concerns. First, we employ the instrumental 
variables estimation method to the main model. We use the industry average scores of ESG 
performance and disclosure, and a dummy variable for whether the previous year’s earnings is 
negative (loss) as instrumental variables for ESG performance and disclosure ratings. Also, to 
mitigate the issue of reverse causality (i.e., the cost of debt in the previous period affects current 
ESG investment), we follow El Ghoul et al. (2011) and Chen et al. (2011) and include the 
lagged cost of debt as an independent variable. This dynamic panel model is estimated using 
the system GMM technique developed in Blundell and Bond (1998). In both of these tests, the 
results indicate that endogeneity concerns are not likely to be driving our primary evidence. 
Results are reported in table 7. 
Third, our sample shows a high representation of UK firms, which is a common characteristic 
of sample distributions in most of the EU-based studies (e.g., Daske et al., 2008; Aharony et 
al., 2010; Byard et al., 2011; Glaum et al., 2013). To ensure the robustness of the findings, we 
regress the main models after excluding the UK firms from the sample, and the findings remain 
the same. Results are reported in table 8.  
Fourthly, we use panel regressions with fixed and random effects for the cost of debt. Based 
on the Hausman test, it is found that the fixed-effects model is more appropriate than the 
random-effects model. Based on the fixed-effects model, there is a significant negative 
association between both ESG performance and disclosure and the cost of debt. Also, we find 
a significant effect of the ESG disclosure on the relationship between ESG performance and 
the cost of debt, which is consistent with the findings of the main test. However, we find no 
significant effect of Stake on the relationship between both ESG-perform and ESG-disclose 
and the cost of debt. Results are reported in table 9.  
Fifthly, based on La Porta et al. (1997), we classify all 15 EU countries into two groups; the 
code-law countries and common-law countries and run the main tests (results not reported). 
We find, in general, firms in code-law countries have significantly lower cost of debt than firms 
in common-law countries. However, we find no significant difference between both types of 
countries in terms of the strength of the association between the cost of debt and ESG 







Finally, we investigate whether the cost of debt reaction to firms’ ESG performance and 
disclosure is a function of its default risk by regressing the same model after adding a dummy 
variable of default risk (based on the size of the leverage (i.e. above median and below median)) 
and its interaction with ESG performance and disclosure. In this regard, prior studies employ 
leverage to control for default risk (e.g., Baker et al., 2003; Verwijmeren and Derwall, 2010; 
Sun and Cui, 2014; Cheng et al., 2014). For example, Baker et al. (2003) find that firms with 
high leverage are less capable of obtaining more debt financing because the probability of 
default is already high. Likewise, Verwijmeren and Derwall (2010) document that firms reduce 
probability of default risk and bankruptcy by operating with lower debt ratios. Also, Sun and 
Cui (2014) find that firm’s leverage is positively related to default risk. We find that both ESG 
performance and disclosure have significant associations with the cost of debt in both types of 
firms. However, this association is weaker in default risk firms (results not reported).  
[Insert table 7 here] 
[Insert table 8 here] 
[Insert table 9 here] 
 
6. Conclusions 
The primary aim of this paper is to gain a deeper understanding of the consequences of ESG 
performance and its related disclosures that occur in the context of the European Union. Based 
on legitimacy and institutional theories, there are three objectives of this paper. Firstly, we 
address whether lending institutions can interfere in the relationship between firms, state and 
the community to motivate firms to improve their ESG performance and its related disclosures. 
Specifically, we examine whether lending institutions reward firms in 15 EU countries for their 
ESG performance and disclosure in the form of lowering their cost of debt capital.  Secondly, 
given that, the social accounting literature links ESG disclosures to the symbolic approach (e.g., 
Patten, 2002; Cho and Patten, 2007; Milne and Gray, 2013), we investigate whether lending 
institutions will distinguish between ESG performance and disclosures (substantive versus 
symbolic approaches) as part of their lending decision. Thirdly, building on institutional theory, 
we address the role of the state and community in shaping the effects of ESG performance and 








Using a sample of 6,018 firm-year observations, our findings suggest that firms can benefit 
from increasing the level of ESG performance and disclosure, which in turn are translated into 
a lower cost of capital charged by lending institutions. These findings imply that market forces, 
represented by lending institutions, can initially play a role in improving the relevance and 
credibility of ESG performance and disclosure and impact sustainable development. 
Nevertheless, our finding also documented that not only does ESG disclosure have an equal 
impact on the cost of debt, but also acts as a substitute for ESG performance. Thus, although 
market forces in the context, represented by decisions and practices of lending institutions, lead 
to relatively desirable social outcomes through rewarding ESG performance and disclosures, 
there is a failure to distinguish between ESG performance and disclosure (substantive and 
symbolic approaches).  
Moreover, we find that stakeholder orientation at a country level (consistent with a more 
community orientated approach) shapes the effects of ESG disclosure and practices on the cost 
of debt. In particular, the reported evidence suggests that the impact of ESG practices on the 
cost of debt is more dominant in stakeholder-oriented countries (where community is more 
prevalent). This, in turn, suggests that ESG practices may be appropriately assessed by civil 
society as a potential agent for securing change in business behaviour (Deegan, 2017). These 
findings also reflect upon the importance of the role that the civil society and the state play in 
addressing and exploring the limitations of free-market regimes. For instance, Maignan (2001) 
documented that French and German consumers are relatively more concerned about firms 
conforming to legal and ethical standards than U.S. consumers who instead give greater 
weighting to the narrower appreciation of corporate economic responsibilities. In line with this, 
our findings suggest that the market lead to more desired social outcomes (i.e. rewarding ESG 
practices by lowering cost of debt) when firms belong to a country in which stakeholder groups 
such as employees, consumers, the government, and communities are likely to have a greater 
influence on firms’ operational decisions.  
 
The results of our study have academic and practical implications. Our findings support the 
idea of complementary roles between market, state and communities. Our findings suggest that 
the market play a role in motivating ESG practices by firms (i.e. by rewarding ESG 







performance and disclosure is higher when the state and community, as measured by the level 
of stakeholder orientation is more prevalent. This, in turn, implies that the state and community 
reinforce the role of the ‘free market’ through demand from social constituents, sanctions and 
boycott or mandatory requirements by the government. Thus, our findings should be of interest 
to regulators and policymakers, who are considering mandating ESG practices in their 
respective contexts.   
Although this study sheds new light on the association between ESG practices and the cost of 
debt, it has a number of limitations that represent avenues for future research. First, this study 
employed secondary data obtained from specialised databases (Thomson Reuters Asset4, 
Bloomberg, and Thomson Reuters DataStream). Although these databases are widely accepted 
in management and accounting literature, collecting primary data would strongly support our 
findings. For example, interviewing CEOs of lending institutions in European countries on the 
lending decision process, and developing an index for measuring ESG practices manually. 
Furthermore, our research findings on the association between ESG practices and the cost of 
debt might be dependent upon the measures of ESG practices we employed. Therefore, the 
choice of how to measure ESG practices and how it impacts the economic consequences of 
ESG practices represents an avenue for future research. Second, we use the ratio of a firm’s 
interest expense to its average debt as an accounting measure of the cost of debt, which could 
be noisy if a firm changes its level of debt near year-end. Although we use credit rating as a 
robust measure of the cost of debt, future research can employ or develop enhanced measures 
of the cost of debt to overcome this limitation. Finally, our study focuses on non-financial listed 
firms in 15 countries in the EU; it would be interesting for future research to expand the sample 
to include countries with emerging economies and diverse cultural and different institutional 
settings to investigate whether it will impact the association between ESG practices and the 
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Table 1: Total number of firms per industry and country 
Panel A: Total number of firms per industry 
Industry Total 
Basic Materials 563 9.4% 
Consumer Goods 908 15.1% 
Consumer Services 1,287 21.4% 
Health Care 369 6.1% 
Industrials 1,879 31.2% 
Oil & Gas 450 7.5% 
Technology 326 5.4% 
Telecommunications 236 3.9% 
Total 6,018 100% 
 
Panel B: Total number of firms per country 
Country Total 
Austria 81 1.3% 
Belgium 161 2.7% 
Denmark 214 3.6% 
Finland 237 3.9% 
France 761 12.6% 
Germany 653 10.9% 
Greece 109 1.8% 
Ireland 132 2.2% 
Italy 251 4.2% 
Netherlands 203 3.4% 
Norway 159 2.6% 
Portugal 82 1.4% 
Spain 357 5.9% 
Sweden 250 4.2% 
UK 2,368 39.3% 









Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean S.D. 0.25 Mdn 0.75 
The cost of debt (CoD) 0.064 0.07 0.037 0.051 0.067 
Credit ratings 0.462 0.254 0.299 0.467 0.621 
ESG-perform 0.661 0.274 0.453 0.763 0.895 
ESG-disclose 0.359 0.142 0.248 0.355 0.469 
Environmental-perform 0.650 0.280 0.410 0.743 0.907 
Social-perform 0.672 0.261 0.486 0.750 0.901 
Governance-perform 0.595 0.260 0.403 0.651 0.817 
Environmental-disclose 0.297 0.166 0.163 0.295 0.419 
Social-disclose 0.385 0.161 0.281 0.386 0.509 
Governance-disclose 0.527 0.114 0.464 0.536 0.607 
LEV 0.93 0.887 0.47 0.47 1.12 
Size (log of total assets) 0.252 0.172 0.128 0.238 0.351 
ROA 15.02 1.47 13.99 14.93 15.93 
IntCov 0.0515 0.0789 0.0205 0.0488 0.0832 
Stake 0.930 0.887 0.470 0.470 1.120 
Total Assets ($ mils) 11,000 25,000 1,200 3,000 8,300 
Sales ($ mils) 8,300 19,000 980 2,500 7,400 
 
The sample consists of 6,018 firm-year observations over the period 2005 to 2016 (8 industries). Appendix A 
outlines definitions and data sources for all variables. 
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The sample comprises of 6,018 firm-year observations over the period 2005 to 2016. Appendix A outlines 
definitions and data sources for all variables. 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. Significance levels are shown in italics. 
 
 
Table 4: Pooled regressions of ESG performance and ESG disclosure on the cost of debt 
(the interest rate proxy) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LEV 0.096*** 0.095*** 0.096*** 0.091*** 0.092*** 
 (16.6) (12.4) (13.4) (13.2) (13.2) 
Size -0.0068*** -0.0065*** -0.0076*** -0.0065*** -0.0050*** 
 (-8.92) (-6.45) (-7.76) (-6.77) (-5.10) 
ROA -0.034*** -0.024 -0.036** -0.014 -0.0085 
 (-2.74) (-1.30) (-1.97) (-0.79) (-0.48) 
IntCov -0.000056*** -0.000034*** -0.000033*** -0.000028*** -0.000028*** 
 (-6.18) (-3.49) (-3.42) (-2.90) (-2.88) 
Stake -0.0054*** -0.0065*** -0.0061*** -0.0052 -0.0026 
 (-5.34) (-5.41) (-5.23) (-1.22) (-0.82) 
ESG-perform -0.011***  -0.018*** -0.0081 -0.0062 
 (-2.76)  (-2.86) (-1.07) (-0.55) 
ESG-disclose(1)  -0.024** -0.00013 -0.0095 -0.019 
  (-2.57) (-1.08) (-0.80) (-0.56) 
ESG-perform *ESG-
disclose 
  0.023* 0.021* 0.011 
  (1.68) (1.67) (0.29) 
ESG-perform*Stake    -0.015***  
    (-2.78)  
ESG-disclose*Stake     -0.023*** 
     (-2.78) 
Constant 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.24*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 
 (20.1) (12.5) (12.9) (12.8) (9.59) 
N 6,018 3,384 3,384 3,384 3,384 
adj. R2 0.099 0.095 0.105 0.099 0.097 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
The sample comprises of 6,018 firm-year observations over the period 2005 to 2016. Appendix A outlines 
definitions and data sources for all variables. 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italic. 
(1) In column (3) and (4), ESG-disclose variable is measured using a dummy variable that takes the value of one 









Table 5: Pooled regressions of the Environmental, Social and Governance performance 
and disclosure components on the cost of debt 
Panel A: Pooled regressions of the Environmental, Social and Governance Performance 
Scores on the cost of debt 
 (1) (2) (3) 
LEV 0.098*** 0.096*** 0.095*** 
 (17.9) (17.7) (17.5) 
Size -0.0060*** -0.0061*** -0.0072*** 
 (-8.42) (-8.52) (-11.9) 
ROA -0.026** -0.025** -0.026** 
 (-2.11) (-2.06) (-2.13) 
IntCov -0.000048*** -0.000049*** -0.000049*** 
 (-5.29) (-5.44) (-5.38) 
Stake -0.0054*** -0.0057*** -0.0059*** 
 (-5.64) (-5.93) (-6.08) 
Environmental-Perform -0.012***   
 (-3.41)   
Social-perform  -0.012***  
  (-3.20)  
Governance- perform   -0.00084 
   (-0.25) 
Constant 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 
 (19.9) (20.1) (22.0) 
N 6,018 6,018 6,018 
adj. R2 0.104 0.104 0.103 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
The sample comprises of 6,018 firm-year observations over the period 2005 to 2016. Appendix A outlines 
definitions and data sources for all variables. 








Panel B: Pooled regressions of the Environmental, Social, Governance Disclosure Scores 
on the cost of debt 
 (1) (2) (3) 
LEV 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.091*** 
 (12.7) (13.2) (13.0) 
Size -0.0057*** -0.0061*** -0.0059*** 
 (-5.87) (-6.85) (-7.02) 
ROA -0.023 -0.014 -0.012 
 (-1.23) (-0.80) (-0.67) 
IntCov -0.000023** -0.000019* -0.000029*** 
 (-2.26) (-1.93) (-2.96) 
Stake -0.0061*** -0.0065*** -0.0061*** 
 (-5.10) (-5.57) (-5.34) 
Environmental-disclose -0.018**   
 (-2.41)   
Social-disclose  -0.016*  
  (-1.68)  
Governance-disclose   -0.018* 
   (-1.93) 
Constant 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 
 (12.4) (13.9) (14.4) 
N 3166 3292 3379 
adj. R2 0.097 0.096 0.094 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
The sample ranges between 3,166 and 3,379 firm-year observations over the period 2005 to 2016. Appendix A 
outlines definitions and data sources for all variables. 








Table 6: Pooled regressions of ESG performance and ESG disclosure on the cost of debt 
(the credit ratings proxy) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LEV -0.16*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.16*** -0.19*** 
 (-4.58) (-4.92) (-5.00) (-4.37) (-4.06) 
Size 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 (23.2) (17.5) (17.7) (21.2) (16.1) 
ROA 0.75*** 0.86*** 0.80*** 0.80*** 0.80*** 
 (8.36) (7.12) (6.60) (8.46) (6.38) 
IntCov 0.00091*** 0.00070 0.00068 0.00094*** 0.00091** 
 (2.82) (1.57) (1.54) (2.86) (2.03) 
Stake -0.0057 -0.0026 -0.0043 -0.0016*** -0.0051 
 (-0.75) (-0.31) (-0.51) (-3.90) (-1.31) 
ESG-perform 0.12***  0.034 0.0077  
 (3.68)  (0.65) (0.17)  
ESG-disclose  0.17*** 0.23**  0.89 
  (3.24) (2.53)  (0.96) 
ESG-perform*ESG-disclose   0.29***   
  (2.83)   
ESG-perform*Stake    0.18***  
    (3.90)  
ESG-disclose*Stake     0.12 
     (1.44) 
Constant -1.38*** -1.26*** -1.24*** -1.35*** -1.25*** 
 (-19.7) (-13.6) (-12.6) (-16.0) (-10.4) 
N 1,330 1,000 1,000 1,330 1,000 
adj. R2 0.436 0.361 0.365 0.404 0.310 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
The sample comprises of 1,330 firm-year observations over the period 2005 to 2016. Appendix A outlines 
definitions and data sources for all variables. 








Table 7: The endogeneity tests 
 IV IV GMM GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LEV 0.11*** 0.091*** 0.72*** 0.89*** 
 (17.8) (13.0) (8.46) (7.41) 
Size 0.00024 -0.0048*** -0.051*** -0.042*** 
 (0.16) (-2.82) (-5.51) (-3.00) 
ROA -0.0041 -0.011 -0.67*** -0.40 
 (-0.31) (-0.63) (-3.14) (-1.50) 
IntCov -0.000046*** -0.000029*** -0.00034** -0.000072 
 (-4.99) (-2.97) (-2.10) (-0.34) 
Stake -0.0050*** -0.0057*** -0.046*** -0.064*** 
 (-5.03) (-4.79) (-3.95) (-4.18) 
ESG-perform -0.077***  -0.10**  
 (-5.39)  (-1.98)  
ESG-disclose  -0.026*  -0.35*** 
  (-1.72)  (-2.97) 
ESG-perform*ESG-
disclose 
    
     
Lag cost of debt   3.74*** 4.02*** 
   (26.2) (17.3) 
Constant 0.14*** 0.17*** -2.01*** -2.10*** 
 (9.90) (8.78) (-14.0) (-9.42) 
N 6,007 3,384 5,269 3,276 
adj. R2 0.060 0.095   
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes No No 
 
The sample ranges between 3,276 and 6,007 firm-year observations over the period 2005 to 2016. Models 1-2 
use the instrumental estimation approach. Models 3-5 are estimated using the system GMM technique after 
adding lag of the cost of debt to the models as explanatory variable. Appendix A outlines definitions and data 
sources for all variables. 








Table 8: Pooled regressions of ESG performance and ESG disclosure on the cost of debt 
after excluding the UK 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LEV 0.066*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.066*** 0.074*** 
 (12.3) (10.7) (10.7) (12.4) (10.8) 
Size -0.0024*** -0.0016* -0.0021** -0.0025*** -0.0017* 
 (-3.28) (-1.69) (-2.23) (-3.40) (-1.84) 
ROA -0.0022 0.0013 0.0012 -0.0014 0.0052 
 (-0.18) (0.072) (0.068) (-0.11) (0.29) 
IntCov -0.000018** -0.0000040 -0.0000026 -0.000018** -0.0000039 
 (-2.10) (-0.45) (-0.28) (-2.13) (-0.43) 
Stake -0.0022*** -0.0031*** -0.0030*** 0.0043** 0.0046* 
 (-2.66) (-3.02) (-2.89) (2.21) (1.72) 
ESG-perform -0.021***  -0.024*** -0.000095**  
 (-5.91)  (-3.91) (-2.05)  
ESG-disclose  -0.036*** -0.015  -0.012 
  (-4.95) (-1.42)  (-1.09) 
ESG-perform*ESG-disclose   0.018*   
   (1.92)   
ESG-perform*Stake    -0.010***  
    (-3.70)  
ESG-disclose*Stake     -0.021*** 
     (-3.10) 
Constant 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 
 (12.2) (7.97) (8.57) (11.5) (7.42) 
N 3,650 2,198 2,198 3,650 2,198 
adj. R2 0.074 0.081 0.078 0.078 0.084 
 
The sample after excluding the UK ranges between 2,198 and 3,650 firm-year observations over the period 2005 
to 2016. Appendix A outlines definitions and data sources for all variables. 








Table 9: Fixed-effect panel regression of ESG performance and ESG disclosure on the 
cost of debt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LEV 0.100*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.100*** 0.13*** 
 (-10.8) (-9.59) (-9.65) (-10.8) (-9.60) 
Size -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.017*** 
 (-5.79) (-4.57) (-4.15) (-5.78) (-4.57) 
ROA -0.0030 -0.015 -0.011 0.0030 -0.015 
 (-0.23) (-0.77) (-0.57) (0.24) (-0.77) 
IntCov -0.000030*** -0.0000061 -0.0000056 0.000031*** -0.0000062 
 (-3.18) (-0.52) (-0.48) (3.20) (-0.53) 
Stake 0.00047 -0.0024 -0.0024 0.0022 -0.0034 
 (0.28) (-1.23) (-1.24) (0.63) (-0.75) 
ESG-perform -0.018***  -0.010 -0.016**  
 (-3.65)  (0.66) (-2.39)  
ESG-disclose  -0.027** -0.00053  -0.030* 
  (-2.23) (1.11)  (-1.74) 
ESG-perform*ESG-
disclose 
  0.00090*   
  (1.68)   
ESG-perform*Stake    -0.0024  
    (-0.56)  
ESG-disclose*Stake     -0.0025 
     (-0.25) 
Constant 0.31*** 0.37*** 0.34*** 0.31*** 0.37*** 
 (8.83) (6.54) (5.86) (8.72) (6.54) 
N 6,018 3,384 3,384 6,018 3,384 
adj. R2 0.0907 0.0822 0.0831 0.0910 0.0820 
 
The sample comprises of 6,018 firm-year observations over the period 2005 to 2016. Appendix A outlines 
definitions and data sources for all variables. 





























Appendix A. Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Panel A. Dependent variables 
CoD The cost of debt calculated as the ratio of a firm’s 
interest expense to the average debt. 
 
The Thomson Reuters 
DataStream database 
Credit Ratings It is based on Fitch Rating: (AAA (24 points); 
AA+ (23 points); AA (22 points); AA- (21 
points); A+ (20 points); A (19 points); A- (18 
points); BBB+ (17 points); BBB (16 points); 
BBB- (15 points); BB+ (14 points); BB (13 
points); BB- (12 points); B+ (11 points); B (10 
points); B- (9 points); CCC+ (8 points); CCC (7 
points); CCC- (6 points); CC+ (5 points); CC (4 
points); CC- (3 points); C (2 points); D (1 points); 
DD (1 points); DDD (1 points)). Then all values 
are divided by 24 to rank all values between 0 to 
1. 
 
The Thomson Reuters 
Asset4 database 
Panel B. ESG variables 
ESG-perform ESG performance based on Thomson Reuters 
ESG ratings, which are designed to measure a 
firm’s relative ESG performance, commitment 
and effectiveness across three main dimensions; 
the environmental dimension, the social 
dimension and governance dimension.  
 
The Thomson Reuters 
Asset4 database 
ESG-disclosure  ESG disclosure based on the Bloomberg database 
index, which are designed to measure a firm’s 
relative ESG disclosure based on the information 
available in firms’ annual reports, corporate 






The environmental dimension of ESG 
performance. 
 
The Thomson Reuters 
Asset4 database 

































Panel C. Control variables 
Size Firm size calculated as a natural logarithm of total 
assets. 
 
The Thomson Reuters 
DataStream database  
LEV Leverage ratio calculated as total debt of a firm 
deflated by total assets. 
 
The Thomson Reuters 
DataStream database 
ROA Return on assets calculated as net income before 
extraordinary items deflated by total assets. 
 
The Thomson Reuters 
DataStream database 
IntCov Interest coverage is calculated as total operating 
income deflated by total interest expense. 
 
The Thomson Reuters 
DataStream database 
Stake Country’s stakeholder orientation calculated as 
the average of a country level score of 
stakeholders orientation developed by Dhaliwal 
et al. (2012) with a higher value indicating greater 
stakeholders orientation.  
 
Dhaliwal et al. (2012)  
 
 
 
